The Northern Flank and High North Scenarios of the Cold War by Dyndal, Gjert Lage
Paper held at conference: «Peripherie oder Kontaktzone? Die NATO-Flanken 1961 bis 2013”, 
Zentrum für Militärgeschichte und Sozialwissenschaften der Bundeswehr, Potsdam, Germany,  
24. October 2013.  
 
The Northern Flank and High North Scenarios of the Cold War  
Colonel (PhD) Gjert Lage Dyndal 
Head of Department for Stategic Studies, Norwegian Command and Staff College, Norway.  
 
The northern region of Europe was important throughout the Cold War, which is well known. 
However, the region was important for several different reasons – for different periods of 
time, and for different people and nations. This chapter will contest the contemporary myth of 
the Cold War as simplistic and static period of time, by laying out the many scenarios 
contemporaries of the Cold war individually often were ignorant or unfamiliar to. The many 
had often enough with their own focus.  
In security studies and research we experience a great different understanding of terminology 
for the description of Europe’s northern countries and area. The region include all from 
northern continental Europe with the southern coasts of the Baltic Sea, to Denmark and its 
Straits, the North Sea, northern Norway and the Barents Sea – and all the way up to the polar 
region. For some the “northern flank” meant the Baltic Sea and its southern borders, for some 
it meant southern Scandinavia, and then for some periods most people associated the 
“northern flank” with the Soviet Northern Fleet and the Barents Sea. For parts of the Cold 
War, the Barents Sea and northern Scandinavia was labelled a “front”, or a “sea battlefront”. 
The most northern areas have also for great parts of the Cold War been labelled the “High 
North”, and for the later decades also been called the “European High North”. All this 
different terminology is linked to and can best be understood by the state of the NATO and 
US versus the Soviet military strategies and technological developments in geopolitical 
terms. According to Øyvind Østenrud, the Cold War strategies were modelled on classical 
geopolitical thought.
1
 This article uses this geopolitical perspective to discuss and explain 
how and why the European High North region, or parts of it, were important throughout the 
                                                          
1
 Østenrud, Øyvind, “The Reemergence of Geopolitics”, downloaded from: 
http://www.geopoliticsnorth.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=45%3Aarticle2&showall=1  
Cold War, and by that also contributing to clarifying the disperse use of terminology and the 
position of the region in the greater Cold War history. Basically, geopolitics was first 
introduced by the Swede Rudolph Kjellen more than a hundred years ago. It was originally a 
theory focusing on the Great Power struggle between the land powers, especially the 
“Russian Heartland”, versus the maritime nations, primarily the British Empire. But have 
later come to include the greater perspective on geographical variables, including military 
strategies and concepts of especially conventional military forces.  
There exists a tremendous body of literature on the Cold War, which may be hard to 
approach for general studies. Methodologically I will review the existing literature on 
western perceptions chronologically, searching for the position of the greater region in the 
Cold War strategies of the time. By this structuring and approach, it becomes apparent how 
the region was important, and to whom, and make a more defined understanding of the 
different meanings of the terminology. Additionally, structured literature review will make a 
good starting-point for future research on detailed parts of the regions Cold War history. This 
is a second, but also important ambition with this chapter.   
The greater understanding of the Cold War 
Over the last two decades, several over-arching reviews of the greater and political aspects of 
the Cold War have come about, challenging the largely politicised literature of the Cold War: 
Be it the “orthodox” who dominated the 1950s and 1960s and who largely argued that the 
West was pushed to defend itself, or the “revisionists” of the Vietnam generation who largely 
believed that Americas hegemony and imperialism pushed the Soviet Union to defend its 
areas of influence, or the later academics and strategic thinkers of the 1970s and 1980s who 
more focused on geo-politics and the complexity of economics and military balance in a more 
realism perspective. Contemporary analysis, with younger academics distancing themselves 
more from the Cold War, or the last generation of Cold War academics and analysts who 
have revisited their perspectives gives today a balanced perspective, including post-
revisionists and realists. Recommended reading on the overall and political Cold War 
dynamics includes especially Dockrill and Hughes’ “Cold War History”, Friedmans “The 
Fifty Year War”, Gaddis’ “The Cold War” and “We Now Know, Rethinking Cold War 
History”, and some great overarching recent works by Hanhimäki, Westad, Leffler and 
Lundestad.
2
  
Several over-arching later research on alliance and military strategy, especially regarding 
naval and nuclear issues, are also important for the greater understanding of the Cold War in 
the northern regions. Especially Freedman, Herrick and Podvig, as well as the official NATO 
history edited by Schmidt makes a good starting point.
3
 Still, some very important studies and 
publications of the Cold War, and research completed in just the aftermath of the fall of the 
Soviet Union, are still to be regarded as important documentation, and must not be 
overlooked: especially the writings of Gorshkovs “The sea power of the State”, Sokolovskiys 
“Soviet Military Strategy”, MccGwires “Soviet Naval Developments” and Ranft and Tills 
“The Sea in Soviet Strategy”. The recommended reading on general military strategy of the 
Cold War, with relevance to the High North and Northern Flank question further includes: 
Sokolskys “Seapower in the Nuclear Age, The United States Navy and NATO 1949-80” and 
Wardak and Turbivilles collection of “The Voroshilov Lectures”, as well as works by 
Spencer, Stromseth and Tunander.
4
  
Recent research in regards the military strategies and operations of the Cold War have not 
really challenged the greater developments described by the literature of the Cold War period, 
but greater insights on details on how things came about have been developed, based on 
research from original and declassified sources. The most important contemporary research 
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include the works by Chernyavskii, “The Era of Gorshkov: Triumph and Contradictions”; 
Dyndal, “How the High North became Central in NATO Strategy: Revelations from the 
NATO Archives”; Juntunen “The Baltic Sea in Russian Strategy”; Ketov, “The Cuban 
missile Crisis as Seen Through a Periscope”; Kokoshin, Soviet Strategic Thought, 1917-91; 
Kolnogorov, “To Be or Not To Be: The Development of Soviet Deck Aviation”; Kurth, 
“Gorshkov’s Gambit”;  Mawdsley, “The Russian Navy in the Gorshkov Era”; Rohwer and 
Monakov, “Stalin’s Ocean-Going Fleet”; Yegorova, “Stalin’s Conception of maritime Power: 
Revelations from the Russian Archives”. These, and other, concrete studies and research on 
the “northern flank” and “High North” challenges will be referred to, discussed and 
contextualised within the framework of the strategic scenarios laid out later in the chapter.  
The Northern Flank and High North Cold War Scenarios 
Based on a geopolitical perspective and on the above over-arching literature on the Cold War 
and the strategies of NATO and the USA, it is possible to broadly define seven scenarios for 
how and to whom the northern region of Europe has been important in the greater Cold War 
play.
5
  
 The American Strategic Air Power Offensive against Northern Russia 
 The Central Fronts "Tactical North Flank" 
 The Fight for the Norwegian Sea 
 The Soviet and U.S. Strategic Missile Interchange 
 The Barents Sea Bastion, an Independent Theatre of War  
 NATO Flexible Response, and the Flank as a Peripheral Theatre of War  
 Soviet Fighting for Access to the Atlantic Ocean 
By this sorting of scenarios, it is better possible to dive into and sort the tremendous body of 
literature there exist on the question of the “Northern Flank” and “High North” perceptions of 
NATO.  
 
The American Strategic Air Power Offensive against Northern Russia 
As regards the first period of the Cold War from 1945 to the end of the 1950s, also called the 
“formative years”, American superior air power and their ability to deliver nuclear bombs 
                                                          
5
 This structuring of scenarios will be supported by/in the individual chapters.  
dominated the strategic outlook of both the entire Scandinavian area and the greater polar 
region. The American detonation of the nuclear bombs over Japan marked their superiority, 
not least to Stalin and the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union lagged behind and detonated their 
first nuclear bomb, the RDS-1 29 August 1949, and did not have any effective capacity until 
3-4 years later.
6
 This scenario included both American strategic bomber aircraft and Anglo-
American carrier task forces.  
The clearly most important focus was on American strategic bomber aircraft with nuclear 
bombs, which would be crossing the North Pole and the northern parts of Norway for deep 
strikes towards the Soviet Union. Additionally, Anglo-American aircraft carrier task forces 
trained for and were planned to strike from the Norwegian Sea and towards Soviet naval and 
air defence bases in the northern areas of the Barents Sea and White Sea for paving way for 
the strategic bomber fleet, as well as bases in the southern Scandinavian Peninsula and the 
Baltic Sea in the late 1940s and early 1950s. From the mid-1950s till the early 1960s, theses 
naval carrier based strike forces also became part of the strategic air strike capability. 
Recommended reading on the scenario of “the American Strategic Air Power Offensive 
against northern Russia” includes first most: Berdals “The United States, Norway and the 
Cold War, 1954-60”, Groves “The Superpowers and Secondary Navies in Northern Waters 
during the Cold War” and Tamness “The United States and the Cold War in the High 
North”.7  Additionally, other works of Berdal, as well as Allard, Amundsen, Grove, and 
Kadyshev are recommended reading.
8
   
This same scenario, which first was part of the early Cold War years, was later repeated with 
large carrier task forces of the 1980s, within the framework of the American "Maritime 
Strategy".
9
 In conclusion, the strategic air power offensive against northern Russia scenario 
was primarily a military strategic independent “front” of the US Air Force bomber era of the 
1950s.  
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 The Central Fronts "Tactical North Flank" 
Both American and British politicians and strategic thinkers kept both the perspectives of a 
“continental” and “maritime strategy” open and alive from the beginning of the Cold War.  
Even though they were both fundamentally maritime global powers; they were also pinned 
down to protect continental Europe.
10
 However, in the 1950s and the 1960s the “continental 
strategy” and SACEUR clearly dominated NATO strategic outlook and priorities. In this 
setting southern Scandinavia and the Baltic Sea southern borders became an important 
“tactical north flank” to the Central Front and the envisaged great land battle of Europe. This 
scenario: “the Central Fronts ‘Tactical North Flank’”, is well covered in the recent partly 
official history by DIIS: “Denmark during the Cold War”, the partly official “Norwegian 
Defence History” by Skogrand and the Swedish official history “Peace and Security”.11 
Additionally, Hallerbachs “Baltic Strategy Past and Present”, Juntunens “The Baltic Sea in 
Russian Strategy” and Groves “The Superpowers and Secondary Navies in Northern Waters 
during the Cold War” offers great insights. Further, a good review of the political 
perspectives of the Scandinavian countries can be found in Olesens “The Cold War – and the 
Nordic Countries, Historiography at a Crossroads”.12 
In fact, the Baltic Sea Fleet was the most potent of all the Soviet Fleets around 1950.
13
 This 
included both amphibious forces and larger surface combatants. However, the capacity 
largely eroded by the late 1950s, as the Soviet focus switched to a strong submarine and 
nuclear force build-up in general, and the main surface combatants were transferred to the 
Northern Fleet. About the rational for this strong naval force, as well as the impressive air-to-
ground air forces in the Baltic Sea region in this early period of the Cold War, assessments 
are that they were probably both intended for defensive operations and flank support of the 
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land-forces of the continent.  However, there was also strong fear in NATO in the 1950s of 
Soviet ambitions for the Baltic Sea Feet to break out through the Danish Straits.
14
  
The Baltic Sea Fleet, especially its amphibious forces was somewhat reactivated from the 
mid-1960s. The Baltic Sea Fleet then became primarily a regional or local naval force, 
comprised of and built around amphibious forces.
15
  
The scenario “tactical north flank” of the Central Front developed in parallel to the American 
strategic air power strategy over the polar region and the Anglo-American naval strike 
strategy from the North Sea and the Norwegian Sea. In SACEURs NATO of the 1950s and 
1960s, the perspective of the northern areas was restricted to southern Scandinavia and the 
Baltic Sea, and this area had the status of a “tactical north flank” to the Central Front. As part 
of this outlook, NATO established the sub-ordinate headquarter AFNORTH at Kolsaas in 
Oslo in the early 1950s.  
This strategic outlook and assessment dominated in the 1950s and early 1960s, but it became 
less the focus of NATO as its main northern focus soon shifted to the High North.  The Baltic 
Sea remained a tactical north flank, and the southern Scandinavian areas remained in the 
plans for low-level bomber aircraft from the North Sea. The region remained in the Cold War 
play – though in a lesser scale throughout the Cold War.16  
 
The Fight for the North Norwegian Sea 
The Soviet Navy Northern Fleet under leadership of Admiral Gorshkov developed a 
defensive naval strategy based on attack submarines and air forces with missiles in the late 
1950s. It was an unconventional, but balanced navy, built for denying the Anglo-American 
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forces its dominance in the North Sea, Norwegian Sea and Barents Sea. After the emergence 
of the strategic strike submarines (SSBNs) in the late 1960s, a capability truly developed and 
central to the Cold War play throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the Barents Seas became 
important for the Soviet Navy in a tactical defensive strategy to protect these strategic 
"bastions" of SSBN submarines. At the same time the Norwegian Sea became important for 
offensive tactical operations with the growing naval infantry.  
In regards an overview of this exact era and scenario, there exists a tremendous body of 
literature. The most authoritative literature includes: Jonathan Alfords statements in Tills 
“Britain and NATO’s Northern Flank” , Børresen, Gjeseth and Tamnes “official” Norwegian 
Defence History, Dyndals “How the High North became Central in NATO Strategy: 
Revelations from the NATO Archives”, Grove and Thomsons “Battle for the Fjords”, Jervell 
and Nybloms “The Military Buildup in the High North. American and Nordic Perspectives”, 
Kokoshins “Soviet Strategic Thought, 1917-91”, Podvigs “Russian Strategic Nuclear 
Forces”, Tamness “The United States and the Cold War in the High North” and Winklers 
“Cold War at Sea”.17  
The High North in the 1970s and 1980s, here understood as the Barents Sea, Northern 
Norway and the North Norwegian Sea, became a battle ground in its own right.  
Well-balanced and capable land-based air power of the Soviet Union, operating from north 
Norwegian airfields would have seriously displaced the power balance of Britain and 
northern Europe. As stated by Jonathan Alford, former Director of the International Institute 
for Strategic Studies, and a great debater on these strategic issues in the 1980s: 
In part this is about the Soviet interdiction of the trans-Atlantic routes; in part this is 
about the Soviet need to keep NATO naval forces well away from important Soviet 
assets; and in part it is about the reinforcement by the sea of the NATO north – and 
all are interconnected… 
I will assert that it is the Norwegian airfields which are – or ought to be – of greatest 
concern. I suggest the following syllogism: who controls the Norwegian Sea depends 
on who controls the North Norwegian airfields: who controls those airfields depends 
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on who gets there first: and who gets there first depends on who controls the 
Norwegian Sea.
18
   
 
The Soviet and U.S. Strategic Missile Interchange 
The launch of the Sputnik in 1957, and the subsequent emergence of intercontinental ballistic 
missiles had huge consequences for the Cold War developments, and especially the northern 
region. The U.S. air force had been superior with their long-range strategic air power 
capability, but the balance changed in the strategic nuclear missile era’ from 1960. The Soviet 
Rocket Forces (the RVSN) was established and capable of launching the first intercontinental 
missile, the ICBM, R-7 (SS-6), 17 December 1959.
19
 In the West there was perceived a 
Missile Gap, in favour of the Soviet Union in the 1960s, and the stalemate of Mutual Assured 
Destruction – MAD – came to influence the rest of the Cold War. There came a shift from the 
“Age of the bomb” to the “Age of the missile”.20  
The long-range early warning systems and an enormous build-up of strategic missiles became 
a new central part of the Cold War from the early 1960s, and the High North, here meaning 
the polar region and northern Scandinavia became military strategic important of another  
reason; the over-flight route for the land based strategic intercontinental ballistic missiles. 
Recommended reading on the scenario of “the Soviet and U.S. Strategic Missile 
Interchange”: Berdals “The United States, Norway and the Cold War”, Bluths “The Soviet 
Union and the Cold War: Assessing the Technological Dimension”, Dyndals “How the High 
North became Central in NATO Strategy: Revelations from the NATO Archives”, Miasnikov 
“Naval Strategic Nuclear Focus”, Pedlows “The Evolution of NATO Strategy 1949-1969”, 
Sokolovskiys “Soviet Military Strategy”, Tamness “The United States and the Cold War in 
the High North” and Tunanders “Cold Water Politics. The Maritime Strategy and Geopolitics 
of the Northern Front”.21  
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This “missile interchange” scenario of the High North, as well as the MAD situation, lasted 
out the Cold War.
22
 
 
The Barents Sea Bastion, an Independent Theatre of War  
The High North was not particularly central to NATO strategies in the 1950-1960, except for 
the strategic strike forces, but these were more a US concern. SACEURs focus on the central 
section dominated in the greater NATO discussions. All through the 1960s, SACLANT had 
argued his concerns about the Soviet Northern Fleet build-up, but without influence on the 
greater prioritizations.
23
 With the development of the Flexible Response strategy, the flanks 
gradually became more important (as we will see in the following sub-chapter). However, it 
was more than anything the awakening to the first true SSBN capability of the Soviet which 
led to the truly strong focus to the High North for NATO.
24
  
The first Soviet nuclear strategic submarine, the Hotel-class, was completed by 1960. The 
evolution continued, and by 1967 and the production of the Yankee-class NATO reacted to 
the evolving SSBN threat. The well-known “Bastion” of the Barents and the Arctic soon 
became a reality with the SS-N-8 Sawfly SLBM which entered service with the Delta-class in 
the early 1970s.
25
 The “Bastion concept” came to influence both the balancing of Soviet 
Naval Forces, as well as it provoke a focused NATO build-up of ASW forces in the High 
North.  
Reading on the scenario of “the Barents Sea Bastion, an Independent Theatre of War” should 
include the authorative work by Herricks: “Soviet Naval Doctrine and Policy”. Further 
detailed reading on the Bastion concept and the SSBNs can be found in: Børresen, Gjeseth, 
and Tamness “official” Norwegian Defence History, Freedmans “The Evolution of Nuclear 
Strategy”, Podvigs “Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces”, Polmar and Moores “Cold War 
Submarines” and Ranft and Tills “The Sea in Soviet Strategy”.26  
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The development of the Bastion concept of the Barents Sea made the region an independent 
theatre of war from the early 1970s, including the creation of large and expensive specialised 
NATO forces of aircraft, hunter submarines and intelligence systems and ships.  
 
NATO Flexible Response, and the Flank as a Peripheral Theatre of War  
In American perspective, the “Massive Retaliation” strategy and its “trip-wire” which had 
developed during the 1950s had become inflexible by the early 1960s. A new grand strategy 
of “Flexible Response” had become US policy under Kennedy from the early 1960s, but 
NATO would not officially adopt the new strategy until as late as 1967.  
The “Flexible Response” strategy focused on; “direct defence” – seeking out the enemy to 
defeat him at a conventional level, and if the conventional direct defence should fail, the 
plans were to go to the next level of “deliberate escalation”, including the use of nuclear 
tactical weapons. Should all this fail, the last resort was to go to a “general nuclear response”.   
For this to be credible, NATO needed to: assure a second-strike retaliatory nuclear capability 
based on a triad of land, sub-surface, and air-launched nuclear weapons, ensure close control 
of tactical nuclear weapons, and not least develop credible and mobile conventional forces. 
This latter soon proved to have great influence for the status of both the southern and 
northern regions of Europe.
27
  
The terminology “flanks”, which also was used at the time, were and are misleading, as the 
areas of the High North of Scandinavia (and Turkey) in reality became independent theatres 
of war preparations, partly as a flank – but rather as areas where NATO hoped to limit the 
war-fighting. More correctly, the High North (and Turkey) under the umbrella of “Flexible 
Response” should be labelled “Peripheral Theatres of War”.   
Also this scenario occupied many researchers during the Cold War, and following a great 
body of important literature exists: Maloneys “Fire Brigade or Tocsin? NATO’s ACE Mobile 
Force, Flexible Response and the Cold War”, Tamnes’ “The United States and the Cold War 
in the High North” and Groves “The Superpowers and Secondary Navies in Northern Waters 
during the Cold War” are very useful.28 Additionally, a more general literature dealing with 
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Soviet Fighting for Access to the Atlantic Ocean 
The Soviet Union have had global maritime aspirations at several points of history in modern 
time, all from the 1930s, by when Stalin envisioned an ocean-going navy, as he also did in 
the immediate years following the Second World War, “The Great Fatherland War” in 
Russian history, and following the Korean War.
30
 However, the Soviet Navy did not 
prioritize the global maritime aspirations until the 1960s, by when the Black Sea Fleet and 
operations in the Mediterranean became a reality, and soon after also proved their global 
reach to the Indian Ocean and South-East Asia. As the Northern Fleet build-up came about in 
the late 1960s for the sea power part of the nuclear triad, the Barents Sea also became the 
prioritized basing for the global reach naval surface forces. The Northern Fleet, from the 
Barents Sea, via the northern Norwegian Sea and out through the Greenland-Iceland-United 
Kingdom (GIUK) Gap, was the least restricted access the “global reach” Soviet Navy could 
get. With the status of NATO forces, both the Baltic Sea and Black Sea were effective closed 
off for such large fleets. The main surface forces were transferred from the two other fleets in 
the mid-1960s.
31
  
The true growth of the global reach came about in the 1960s, and is well documented by 
several important academics of the time, especially MccGwire, Mitchell, Ranft and Till, 
Herrick and Fairhall.
32
 The works of admiral Gorshkov are also still important documentation 
of the maritime global aspirations
33
, and several other works gives important details and 
discussions: Allard, Archer and Scrivener, Christoph and Holst, Børresen, Gjeseth and 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
United States and the Cold War in the High North, pp.195-207, 225-226, 233-238; Grove, “The Superpowers 
and Secondary Navies in Northern Waters during the Cold War”, pp.215-218.   
29
 See bibliography for full references.  
30
 Dyndal, ”The rise of the Soviet Navy, a re-visited Western view”.   
31
 Ibid.  
32
 MccGwire, Soviet Naval Developments; Mitchell, Donald, A History of Russian and Soviet Sea Power 
(London: Andre Deutsch Limited, 1974); Ranft and Till, The Sea in Soviet Strategy; Herrick, Soviet Naval 
Doctrine and Policy; Fairhall, Russia looks to the Sea.   
33
 Gorshkov, The sea power of the State. The status and importance of Gorshkovs writing, both this book which 
was published in the West and his many articles in the Soviet Union are well discussed in Herricks “Soviet 
Naval Doctrine”.  
Tamnes, Chernyavskii, Ellingsen, Friedman, Mawdsley, Skogan and Brundtland, Sokolsky, 
Walsh, and Winkler.
34
 
The Northern Fleet of the Barents Sea, and this scenario of the “Soviet Fighting for Access to 
the Atlantic Ocean” became apparent with the famous Okean naval exercise out in the north 
Atlantic in 1970 (and 1975).
35
 Also this scenario of “global access” remained throughout the 
Cold War.  
Conclusions 
As we have seen, the terminology, including both the geographical and strategic meaning, 
have changed over time, as well as in the perspectives of different actors.  
The terminology “flank” meant that the region was subordinate to and part of the more 
central battlefront. The southern shores of the Baltic Sea and the countries bordering the 
Baltic Sea were important as a flank to the Central Front. In SACEURs perspective, this was 
the case throughout the Cold War. If you go to more naval dominated communities, the 
terminology “flank” was less used, where the terminology “front” or “theatre” was largely 
used about the northern Norwegian Sea in the latter half of the Cold War.  
As a “flank”, the perceptions could be either about the Baltic Sea and southern Scandinavia, 
which was the case for the first two decades of the Cold War. The threat was at its highest 
around 1950, and then less in focus until a somewhat modern Soviet amphibious capacity 
was rebuilt from the mid-1960s. From the late 1960s, the term “flank” was still used, but the 
general perception had shifted to the northern parts of Scandinavia, mostly North Norway and 
the northern seas. However, the “High North”, here meaning North Norway and northern 
Scandinavia and the seas up to the polar region, became in reality independent “peripheral 
theatres of war” under the era of Flexible Response. In NATO strategy one hoped to limit the 
war-fighting to these regions, and thus using the terminology “flank” would all-together be 
misleading.  
The review of the existing literature, both the most prominent Cold War literature and the 
(limited) new research, have proved that perceptions and status of the region and the 
                                                          
34
 See bibliography for full references.  
35
 Skogan, John and Arne Brundtland eds, Soviet Sea Poer in Northern Waters (New York: St.Martin’s Press, 
1970), p.15; Kokoshin, Andrei A.: Soviet Strategic Thought, 1917-91 (Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1998), p 
130.  
 
following use of terminology have changed over time and with context. The chapters main 
contribution is to make researchers and readers aware of these important distinctions, here 
defined as seven different scenarios for how and to whom different parts of the region were 
important in the Cold War NATO strategies.  
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